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ABSTRACT
Firefox Add-on for Metamorphic JavaScript Malware Detection
by Sravan Kumar Reddy Javaji

With the increasing use of the Internet, malicious software has more
frequently been designed to take control of users computers for illicit purposes.
Cybercriminals are putting a lot of efforts to make malware difficult to detect. In
this study, we demonstrate how the metamorphic JavaScript malware can effect a
victim’s machine using a malicious or compromised Firefox add-on. Following the
same methodology, we develop another add-on with malware static detection
technique to detect metamorphic JavaScript malware.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am very thankful to my advisor Dr. Thomas Austin for his continuous
guidance and support throughout this project and believing me. Also, I would like
to thank the committee members Dr. Chris Pollett and Mr. Fabio Di Troia for
monitoring the progress of the project and their valuable time.

v

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER
1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1

1.1

Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2

1.2

Proposed Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3

1.3

A Browser Plugin for Detecting Malware . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4

2 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5

2.1

Encrypted Malware . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

6

2.2

Polymorphic Malware . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

7

2.3

Metamorphic Malware . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

8

2.3.1

Register renaming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

8

2.3.2

Dead code insertion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

10

2.3.3

Subroutine permutation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

10

2.3.4

Equivalent code substitution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

11

2.3.5

Transposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

11

2.3.6

Changing control flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

12

2.3.7

Subroutine inlining and outlining . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

12

Transcriptase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

12

2.4.1

Permutator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

15

2.4.2

Variable/Function-Name randomization . . . . . . . . . . .

16

2.4.3

Meta-Language Symbols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

17

2.4.4

Code Derivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

18

2.4

vi

2.4.5

Variable/Function insertion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

19

Rhino . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

20

2.5.1

Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

21

2.5.2

Modification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

24

3 Firefox Add-on Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

27

2.5

3.1

Firefox vs Chrome . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

28

3.2

SDK vs XUL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

29

3.3

Chrome Authority Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

31

3.4

Content Scripts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

32

4 Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

35

4.1

Malicious add-on . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

35

4.2

Transcriptase detection add-on . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

37

4.2.1

Malware Detection Technique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

38

4.2.2

Opcode Graph Similarity Technique . . . . . . . . . . . . .

38

4.2.3

Opcode Graph . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

39

4.2.4

Similarity Score Calculation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

41

4.3

Transcriptase detection add-on architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . .

43

4.4

JavaScript extraction from web page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

45

4.5

Purpose of the Shell script . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

48

4.6

Page validation and clean-up step . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

50

4.7

Performance improvements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

50

4.7.1

Fingerprinting web pages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

51

4.7.2

Whitelisting websites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

51

vii

4.8

Using other detection techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

52

5 Testing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

53

5.1

Generating Transcriptase variants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

53

5.2

Similarity scores and add-on performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

55

5.2.1

Addition of 550 lines of dead code . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

55

5.2.2

Addition of 5500 lines of dead code . . . . . . . . . . . . .

56

5.2.3

Addition of 15000 lines of dead code . . . . . . . . . . . . .

57

5.3

Test for False Positive rate of the add-on . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

59

5.4

Splitting Transcriptase code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

59

6 Conclusion and Future Enhancements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

70

APPENDIX
Code snippets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

75

A.1 Python parser . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

75

viii

LIST OF TABLES
1

System Specifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

53

2

Scores table of benign web pages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

61

3

Scores table of malware web pages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

62

4

Scores table of benign web pages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

63

5

Scores table of malware web pages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

64

6

Scores table of benign web pages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

65

7

Scores table of malware web pages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

66

8

Summary of max and min Scores . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

67

9

Scores table for popular web pages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

68

10

Splitting Transcriptase into several files . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

69

ix

LIST OF FIGURES
1

JavaScript Sample and its obfuscated version. . . . . . . . . . . .

3

2

Annual Malware Growth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

6

3

Encrypted Malware Replication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

7

4

Examples of a polymorphic virus. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

8

5

Metamorphic malware with different signatures . . . . . . . . . .

9

6

Register Renaming Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

9

7

Example of code metamorphosis of Evol virus . . . . . . . . . . .

10

8

Example of subroutines permutation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

11

9

Sample Java code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

12

10

Sample Java code after applying Transposition . . . . . . . . . . .

12

11

Example of changing control flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

13

12

Subroutine inlining example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

13

13

Subroutine outlining example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

14

14

Meta-language instructions example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

15

15

Permutator output . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

16

16

Before Variable/Function-Name randomization . . . . . . . . . .

17

17

After Variable/Function-Name randomization . . . . . . . . . . .

17

18

Meta-Language Symbols Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

18

19

Meta-Language Symbols processing Example . . . . . . . . . . . .

18

20

Block Diagram of Rhino Engine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

21

21

Euclid’s GCD algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

22

22

Abstract Syntax Tree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

23

x

23

Sample byte code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

23

24

Sample Machine Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

24

25

JavaScript compilation with Rhino . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

25

26

JavaScript compilation with modified version of Rhino . . . . . .

26

27

Communication among add-on and content script . . . . . . . . .

33

28

Communication among add-on and content script using code . . .

34

29

Main Functionality of the malicious add-on

. . . . . . . . . . . .

36

30

Size of sample JavaScript files before infection . . . . . . . . . . .

36

31

JavaScript file sizes after infection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

37

32

Sample opcode sequence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

39

33

Weight counts adjacency matrix for opcode sequence . . . . . . .

40

34

Probability matrix for weights adjacency matrix . . . . . . . . . .

41

35

Opcode Graph . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

42

36

Detection add-on architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

43

37

Transcriptase detection add-on directory structure . . . . . . . . .

44

38

Add-on code to disable JavaScript load on web page

. . . . . . .

45

39

JavaScript to extract all the external script file URLs . . . . . . .

47

40

command that invokes opcode.sh internally . . . . . . . . . . . .

48

41

add-on code to invoke opcode.sh

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

49

42

opcode.sh shell script code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

50

43

Batch script . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

54

44

Transcriptase‘s 100 versions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

55

45

Benign Samples vs Malware Samples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

56

xi

46

Benign Samples vs Malware Samples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

57

47

Benign Samples vs Malware Samples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

58

48

Graph showing min and max scores of split files

60

xii

. . . . . . . . .

CHAPTER 1
Introduction

The arrival of the Internet has completely revolutionized our personal and
professional lives. With the rapid growth of the Internet, all the market sectors,
social networking services, advertising and non-commerical sectors are using this
technology in their workflow. As we become more dependent on the online
environment, we can see massive growth of opportunities for IT criminals to take
advantage of user systems.
Internet users often share sensitive information like bank account details or
other personal information, over the network. As personal computers and mobile
phones became an important part in most people‘s lives, these computers became a
hub of user‘s personal information. In this world of ubiquitous computers and
persistent threats from hackers, protecting your computer is a must. Several
websites are hacked to be used as distributors of malware, to infect the visitors
unknowingly with viruses and malware. A single visit to a such a hacked web page
is sufficient for an intruder to get control of a user‘s machine.
In late 2013, one of the bank‘s internal computers that are used by employees
to process and record daily transactions, had been infected with malware [7]. The
malware continuously monitored the bank‘s activities for several months, sending
back images and video feeds to cybercriminals about the bank‘s daily routines.
Then the cybercriminals impersonated bank officers, turned on several cash
machines and also transferred millions of dollars from banks into dummy accounts
of other countries.

1

Consider the fact that more than 6,600 benign websites are getting hacked
every single day [6]. These legitimate websites are turned into distributors of
malware by malicious hackers. Malicious code can be injected into legitimate
Javascript of a benign web page. When a user visits such a compromised website,
this malicious JavaScript will be executed in the victim‘s web browser. Execution of
such malicious JavaScript can infect the victim‘s personal computer. Most of the
times, malicious JavaScript redirects the victim‘s web browser to load more
malicious code from a remote server. This can be achieved through several means,
such as adding an HTML iframe element to a page. Always cybercriminals try to
obfuscate the malicious content from detection. HTML provides very few ways to
obfuscate the code such as adding an HTML iframe element to a page but the huge
number of methods in JavaScript makes it easy to heavily obfuscate the malicious
code into Javascript.
1.1

Problem
Malware is malicious software, specifically designed to gain access to the data

or to damage the resources without the knowledge of victim [4]. Researchers
developed various techniques for malware detection like signature based detection
and heuristic analysis. To overcome the malware detection techniques, malware
writers came up with different types of malwares among which metamorphic
malware is an advanced version. Metamorphic malware is capable of changing its
internal structure without altering its functionality from infection to infection. Due
to the metamorphic nature, such malware is very difficult to detect. With a huge set
of functions, JavaScript makes it possible for virus writers to develop malicious
JavaScript code with metamorphic feature. Transcriptase is such a case, which is
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2
3
4
5
6

//sample.js
<script>
var x = 5;
var y = 6;
var z = x + y;
</script>
//sample_morphed.js
<script>
var y_renamed =
var x_renamed =
var z_renamed =
</script>

- obfuscated version of sample.js
6;
5;
x_renamed + y_renamed;

Figure 1: JavaScript Sample and its obfuscated version.
designed to infect other JavaScript files in the same folder [5].
1.2

Proposed Solution
In spite of the fact that malware can change their internal structure the

priority order of the important commands cannot be changed. Case in point,
consider a sample JavaScript code below,
From the code in Figure 1, it is clear that even though the variable names are
changed and the order of declaration of 𝑥 and 𝑦 (or 𝑥_𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑑 and 𝑦_𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑑)
are changed, the arithmetic operation always follows the declaration of those two
variables else the code may give syntactical errors or the wrong result.
So, we can make use of the opcodes statistical information to detect the
malware.

3

1.3

A Browser Plugin for Detecting Malware
Generally JavaScript malware will be injected into benign web pages. When a

user visits this infected website, the malicious JavaScript code will be executed in
the browser. To prevent this, we can develop an add-on which will monitor the
JavaScript content of every web page and the browser can disable the JavaScript
execution before the page gets loaded. The add-on will analyze the JavaScript in
the background and will enable the JavaScript load, if the web page is found to be
benign or else warn the user about malicious content without loading the JavaScript.
This procedure can secure the victim‘s computer from malware infection. For this
research, we can use the Transcriptase metamorphic JavaScript malware.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we provide
background information on metamorphic malware and with an emphasis on
Transcriptase metamorphic JavaScript malware that forms the basis for the
research. Also in this chapter, we cover the Rhino Javascript engine. Chapter 3
outlines the details of Firefox add-on development. Then in Chapter 4, we discuss
two different static metamorphic detection techniques that we apply to detect the
metamorphic JavaScript malware. In Chapter 5, we present the accuracy and
performance details of Firefox add-on using opcode similarity detection technique.
Our experimental results for the original metamorphic JavaScript appear. Chapter
6 contains the conclusion and consideration for future work.
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CHAPTER 2
Background

Malware is a software program intended to do pernicious activities on a
client‘s computer with the proposition of removing data and misusing assets without
his assent. Viruses and worms are the best known types of malware on account of
the way in which they spread, instead of their behavior. Malware is now and then
utilized widely against government or corporate websites to gather protected data or
to disturb their operations by large. Also, malware is regularly utilized against
people to steal data, for example, personal identification numbers or bank or credit
card details and passwords. As per a survey on data breaches led by Verizon in 2014
[9], Citadel is the preferred banking malware among attackers for stealing individual
information. And for stealing money from bank accounts, Zeus is the favorite
banking malware.
Figure 1 shows how the malware is swiftly growing in volume day-by-day. In
Figure 1, the x-axis specifies the year and the y-axis indicates the number of
malware samples generated in the specified year on the x-axis.
Virus writers are aware that signature-based detection with heuristic analysis
can be the basis of modern malware detection techniques. So, virus developers have
created numerous procedures and techniques to evade signature-based detection. In
January 2015, AV-TEST‘s CEO said, "Many of the new malware samples are just
variants of existing viruses. They have been modified so that they are no longer
detected and thus, AV signature updates are required" [10]. Some of the noteworthy
techniques used by virus writers to evade signature detection are encryption,

5

Figure 2: Annual Malware Growth [10]
polymorphism and metamorphism.
2.1

Encrypted Malware
The Cascade virus, which initially appeared in late 1986, was the first

malware that used encryption to scramble its contents [11]. The Cascade virus is
comprised of two parts. The first part is a decryptor and the second part is
encrypted malware code. The reason for encryption is to conceal the malware
signature, so as to evade signature identification. Later, this technique was adopted
by almost every encrypted malware. For the most part, virus writers use extremely
simple and weak encryption methods, for example, a repeated XOR with a fixed bit
pattern. Cascade malware also used XOR operation as encryption routine because
of its symmetrical and reversible feature. In the event that the encryption key of
malware was changed after every infection, the encrypted body signature also gets
changed. If in case the same decryptor was used, signature detection can make use
of the decryptor code‘s signature to detect the malware.

6

Figure 3: An Encrypting malware spreads without changing decryptor but the key
within decryptor varies from infection to infection. As the key value changes, the
encrypted virus body also changes [14].
2.2

Polymorphic Malware
Similar to an encrypted malware, polymorphic malware incorporates an

encrypted virus code and a decryptor. Additionally in a polymorphic virus, the
decryptor is morphed. During polymorphic malware propogation, not only is the
virus code encrypted, but the decryptor also varies from infection to infection. As
there is no fixed signature or no fixed decryptor to scan for, no two infections look
alike to be exploited by the antivirus program for detection purpose [14].
Polymorphic virus uses code obfuscation techniques, for example, including junk
codes or substitution of instructions, to mutate its decryptor [18]. Several
techniques are utilized to decrypt the polymorphic virus, such as, cryptanalysis
(also called x-ray), emulation and dedicated decryption routines [21].
The first polymorphic malware, 1260, was developed by Mark Washburn in
1990 [15]. And the first widespread polymorphic infection was caused by Tequila
and Maltese Amoeba virus, in 1991 [14].
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1
2
3
4
5

MOV
ADD
ADD
SUB
MOV

A,R1
B,R1
C,R1
#4,R1
R1,X

6
7
8
9

MOV
NOP
ADD
NOP
ADD
NOP
SUB
NOP
MOV

A,R1
B,R1
C,R1
#4,R1
R1,X

MOV A,R1
ADD #0,R1
ADD B,R1
OR R1,R1
ADD C,R1
SHL #0,R1
SUB #4,R1
JMP .+1
MOV R1,X

MOV A,R1
OR R1,R1
ADD B,R1
MOV R1,R5
ADD C,R1
SHL R1,0
SUB #4,R1
ADD R5,R5
MOV R1,X
MOV R5,Y
(d)

10
11

(a)

(b)

(c)

MOV A,R1
TST R1
ADD C,R1
MOV R1,R5
ADD B,R1
CMP R2,R5
SUB #4,R1
JMP .+1
MOV R1,X
MOV R5,Y
(e)

Figure 4: Examples of a polymorphic virus utilizing code obfuscation techniques. All
of the Figure 4 snippets perform the same operation, i.e., 𝑋 = (𝐴 + 𝐵 + 𝐶 − 4). For
instance, the program snippet of Figure 4 (c) is functionally the same as Figure 4 (a)
in light of the fact that instructions like adding 0 to a register, ORing R1 with itself,
shifting R1 left 0 bits, and jumping to the next instruction all do nothing [19].
2.3

Metamorphic Malware
Virus writers took the next step and developed an advanced variant of

polymorphic malware, known as metamorphic malware. Generally, before infection,
polymorphic malware encrypt the virus code and morph the decryptor, while
metamorphic malware morph the whole virus code. According to Igor Muttik,
"Metamorphics are bodypolymorphics", since polymorphism is applied to the entire
virus body [22]. Metamorphic viruses utilizes several code morphing techniques that
constitute instruction reordering, data reordering, subroutine inlining, subroutine
outlining, register renaming, instruction substitution and dead code insertion [23].
Figure 5 illustrates the metamorphic malware with different signatures.
2.3.1

Register renaming
In December 1998, a metamorphic malware named Win95/Regswap was

developed by Vecna [22]. Regswap used register renaming technique to morph the

8

Figure 5: Metamorphic malware with different signatures [20].

Figure 6: code snippet extracted from two different versions of RegSwap [22].
virus code. In this technique, instructions gets modified to use different registers.
As just the register operands gets altered that too in some part of the code instead
of whole code, so the complexity of final modified code wouldn‘t be high. Figure 6
depicts how the register renaming technique transforms the code.
The bold areas in figure 6 illustrates the similarities of the two different code
versions. Thus, a wildcard string, such as 5?𝐵?, could be useful to detect the
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1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

C7060F000055
C746048BEC5151
BF0F00055
893E
5F
52
B640
BA8BEC5151
53
8BDA
895E04

MOV [esi], 5500000Fh
MOV [esi+0004], 5151EC8Bh
MOV edi, 5500000Fh
MOV [esi], edi
POP edi
; garbage
PUSH edx
; garbage
MOV dh, 40
; garbage
MOV edx, 5151EC8Bh
PUSH ebx
; garbage
MOV ebx, edx
MOV [esi+0004], ebx

Figure 7: Example of code metamorphosis of Evol virus with Dead code insertion
[23].
malware code [22].
2.3.2

Dead code insertion
Dead code can be a single instruction or a block of instructions, for example,

adding NOPs [23], adding 0 to a register, moving between same registers, ORing
register with itself, shifting register left 0 bits, jumping to next instruction,
incrementing a register immediately followed by decrementing the same register by
same value. Inserting dead code or do-nothing instructions is the easiest approach
to morph the virus code without modifying its functionality [23]. The Win32/Evol
virus, which was found around July 2000 [24], used dead code insertion to obfuscate
the signature of a code as illustrated in Figure 7.
2.3.3

Subroutine permutation
Code may contain several subroutines (or) functions and changing the order of

this subroutines may not impact the execution of code. Subroutine permutation
approach makes use of this advantage i.e., altering the order of subroutines, to
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Figure 8: Example of subroutines permutation [23].
change its internal structure without modifying the functionality of code. A code
with 𝑛 different subroutines can generate 𝑛! different permutations of subroutines,
thus large number of versions of the same code can be generated [4].
2.3.4

Equivalent code substitution
Different variants of code can be generated by replacing instruction or block of

instructions with an equivalent code. In assembly language there are numerous
semantically equivalent instructions, for instance, ‘INC ecx’ is same as ‘ADD ecx, 1’,
‘XOR R1, R1’ is same as ‘MOV R1, 0’ [25].
2.3.5

Transposition
Morphed copies of virus code can also be created by changing the order of

instructions in the code provided that there is no dependency among instructions,
so this approach is also known as instruction permutation [23]. For instance, the
code in figure 9 can be transformed to figure 10, as the declaration order of variables
doesn‘t affect the arithmetic calculation [4].

11

1
2
3

int a=5;
int b=2;
int c=a+b;

Figure 9: Sample Java code [4].
1
2
3

int b=2;
int a=5;
int c=a+b;

Figure 10: Sample Java code after swapping instructions [4].
2.3.6

Changing control flow
The next code obfuscation method involves insertion of a conditional or

unconditional branch instruction after a block of instructions. Further, instruction
blocks referenced by this branching instructions can be permuted to change the
control flow [23]. Zperm malware used this approach to change the internal
structure of a code [25]. Figure 11 is an example of changing control flow.
2.3.7

Subroutine inlining and outlining
In subroutine inlining procedure, subroutine/function call replaces its code

[23]. Figure 12 illustrates the concept of Subroutine inlining.
On the other hand, code outlining changes a block of instructions into
subroutine (or function) and a subroutine call will be included for the newly created
subroutine. Figure 13 illustrates how the code outlining approach works.
2.4

Transcriptase
Transcriptase is a metamorphic virus implemented in JavaScript. Whenever

Transcriptase is executed, a morphed version of the malware virus gets prepended
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;Original Program
instruction 1 ; entry point
instruction 2
instruction 3
instruction 4
instruction 5
;Modified Program
instruction 2
jump 3
instruction 4
jump 5
instruction 1 ; entry point
jump 2
instruction 3
jump 4
instruction 5

Figure 11: Example of changing control flow [25].
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/* some instrictions */
call S1
call S2
/* some instrictions */
S1:
mov eax, ebx
add eax, 12h
push eax
ret
S2:
mul ecx
mov edx, eax
ret
(a) before transformation

/* some instrictions */
mov eax, ebx
add eax, 12h
push eax
mul ecx
mov edx, eax
/* some instrictions */

(b) after transformation

Figure 12: Subroutine inlining example [25].
to all the JavaScript files in the folder [4]. The infected JavaScript file will become
the variant of Transcriptase. By this way Transcriptase propagates and infects the
benign JavaScript files.
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/* some instrictions */
mov eax, ebx
add eax, 12h
push eax
mul ecx
mov edx, eax
/* some instrictions */

8
9
10
11

(a) before transformation

/* some instrictions */
mov eax, ebx
call S1
mov edx, eax
/* some instrictions */
S1:
push eax
add eax, 12h
mul ecx
ret
(b) after transformation

Figure 13: Subroutine outlining example [25].
The metamorphic engine attached to Transcriptase is a self-hosted compiler,
which contains its own meta-language source-code. Transcriptase obtains
information of its code from meta-language and changes its internal structure.
The format of every line of the meta-code looks like [26]:
(Identifier|Restrictions)instruction

For instance, below are sample meta-instructions:
(200|)var b=0
(300|200)c+1(b)

An Identifier and Restrictions are used by the Permutation function to do
code obfuscation. The identifier is unique for every instruction in the entire code
and restrictions specify the instructions on which the corresponding instruction is
depending. The "instruction" contains the details used to create an actual code.
The compiler creates the new malicious JavaScript code with three steps:
1. Permutation and Variable/Function-Name randomization
14
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(100|)var a=5
(200|)var b=-1
(300|)var x=8
(400|200)c+1(b) // instruction c+1(b) means increment b by 1: i.e. b++
(500|400,100)c+n(b,a) // instruction c+n(b,a) means increment b by a:
i.e. b+=a
(600|500)xWScript.Echo(x)

Figure 14: Meta-language instructions example [4].
2. Code Creation
3. Variable/Function insertion
2.4.1

Permutator
In this phase, the compiler parses through every meta-language instruction,

scope by scope (global scope for global instructions and sub-scope for
if/for/while/functions) and retrieves the identifiers and restrictions details for each
meta-instruction. Later these identifier and restriction details are used by the
compiler to perform the permutation of code.
If the restriction details are empty for all the meta-language instructions, then
it specifies that all the instructions in the code do not have any dependency
instructions. So, the entire code can be permuted in all the possible combinations.
For instance, if there are 𝑛 lines of code, then the permutator can create 𝑛!
variations of the original code.
For instance, consider the code specified in Figure 14 [4]. It contains
restriction details for some of the meta-instructions, which means that those
instructions have dependencies on other instructions. So all the combinations of the
code cannot produce the correct behaviour.
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(200|)var b=-1
(400|200)c+1(b)
(100|)var a=5
(500|400,100)c+n(b,a) // instruction c+n(b,a) means increment b by a:
i.e. b+=a
(300|)var x=8
(600|500)xWScript.Echo(x)

Figure 15: Possible output of the permutator after parsing the code in Figure 14 [4].
From the code in Figure 14, instruction 400 depends on instruction 200,
because the variable "b" has to be defined before it can be incremented; instruction
500 depends on both the instructions 400 and 100; and instruction 600 depends on
instruction 300. Figure 15 contains the code, which could be one of the possible
output generated by the permutator [4]:
As the growth-rate of the permutation function is very fast, even for the large
number of instruction this technique works effectively [26].
2.4.2

Variable/Function-Name randomization
In this step, the keywords like "var", "while", "for", and "def" are searched

initially in the code by the compiler and the details of existing hard-coded names in
those instructions are retrieved. In other words, the details of all the variable names
and function names are gathered by the compiler. These names are replaced with
random names by the compiler and also all the valid occurrences of these
hard-coded names in the current scope are replaced.
For instance, consider the code in Figure 16. First, the compiler searches for
the "var", "function", and "def" keywords and the hard-coded names - num,
multiply, inputparam, and twiceval are retrieved. Then it replaces these hard-coded
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var num=20;
function multiply(inputparam)
{
return 2 * inputparam;
}
def twiceval=multiply(num)

Figure 16: Before Variable/Function-Name randomization [26].
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var ljkjuytbenst=20;
function trqwsdexcv(awsrsfagfqwxczv)
{
return 2 * awsrsfagfqwxczv;
}
def bxswdqtyzyqtc=trqwsdexcv(ljkjuytbenst)

Figure 17: After randomly changing the Variables/Function-Names of the code in
Figure 16 [26].
names with some random names like "ljkjuytbenst" or "awsrsfagfqwxczv". The
compiler also replaces all occurrences of the hard-coded names, for example, there
are two instances of "inputparam" present in the function, both these names are
replaced with the random name. One of the possible changes to the code during this
phase is shown in Figure 17.
2.4.3

Meta-Language Symbols
After rearrangement of the instructions and hard-coded names replacement,

the compiler generates a valid JavaScript code by parsing through every
meta-instruction. These meta-instructions contain meta-level symbols and each of
these symbols has specific meaning like number, element, object etc. While parsing
meta-instructions, compiler processes these meta-level symbols.
For example, consider the code in Figure 18. Here meta-symbol #n...n#
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var number=#n1n#
var str=#"Hello VXers"#
var exp=#x1true1x#
x#O1WScript#.Echo(°+str+°)1O#

Figure 18: Meta-Language Symbols Example [26].
x#O1WScript#.Echo(°+str+°)1O#
could become
function SomeFunction(SomeArg){WScript.Echo(SomeArg);}
SomeFunction(str)

Figure 19: Meta-Language Symbols processing Example [26].
specifies any value present in between #n’s (i.e., in place of ...) specifies Number,
meta-symbol #"..."# specifies any value present in the place of dots (or ...)
specifies string, any value in #xN...Nx# specifies elements, the values between
#01... #. ...10# specifies Objects and the symbol "°+ ... +°" specifies that the
variable inside must be given as an argument for a function, if the instruction is
derived into a function [26].
Figure 19 illustrates how the meta-symbols with objects are processed.
2.4.4

Code Derivation
After processing all the meta-language symbols, the compiler generates

JavaScript code by parsing the meta-language instructions. During this phase,
compiler deals with some more meta-instructions that have specific properties as
mentioned below [26]:
while(initial$var1!var2?operator@action)NNN
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1. "initial" specifies the code that is to be executed before the while loop
like variable declaration
2. "var1" and "var2" along with the "operator" specifies the while loop
condition.
3. "action" specifies the end of the loop instruction like counter increment.
4. "NNN" specifies total number of lines in the loop
cO(1||n||s)
This specifies general way of representing number/string arithmetic
instruction. "O" specifies operator like +, -, *, /. Below are some of the
meta-instructions that follow this format,
1. c+1(var1): increment var1 by 1
2. c+n(var1,var2): increment var1 by the number var2
3. c+s(var1,var2): concatenate var1 with the string var2
4. c-1(var1): decrement var1 by 1
5. c-n(var1,var2): decrement var1 by the number var2
6. c*1(var1): multiply var1 by 1
7. c*n(var1,var2): multiply var1 by the number var2
8. c/1(var1): divide var1 by 1
9. c/n(var1,var2): divide var1 by the number var2
2.4.5

Variable/Function insertion
Several variables and functions are defined during the compilation phase

because of meta-instructions and obfuscation. These variables are saved in special
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arrays instead of being stored in the code. At the end of code derivation phase, they
are placed into the code .
Functions can be included between instructions in the global scope. Variables
can be included between instructions in the current scope, before they are used for
the first time [4]. This phase takes lot of time to complete, as the whole code is
checked for multiple times to find suitable positions for the variable/function
insertions [26].
2.5

Rhino
During 1997, Netscape began working on developing a variant of Netscape

Navigator written in Java [27]. In order to implement the navigator in Java, they
built a JavaScript engine entirely in Java, named Rhino. Rhino is open source
software and is currently maintained by Mozilla.
Most of the time, JavaScript is utilized as a part of HTML for making
interactive webpages. Anyhow, Rhino is not used to create or manipulate webpages;
it is an implementation of the core JavaScript. Rhino has the below aspects [27]:
1. Supports JavaScript 1.7 features
2. Allows direct scripting of Java
3. The Rhino Shell can execute the JavaScript code interactively or in batch
mode
4. The JavaScript Compiler can compile the JavaScript code into Java classes
5. The JavaScript Debugger for debugging scripts in Rhino
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Figure 20: Block Diagram of Rhino Engine [29].
In this research, we use Rhino to translate the JavaScript code into Java
classes. The engine supports both compile mode and interpretive mode. During
compile mode, the engine first translates each JavaScript file to separate Java class
files. These .class files may be executed as Java programs using Rhino runtime
support routines. During interpretive mode, JavaScript is compiled and is stored as
internal representation of the compiled form instead of byte codes. During runtime
this compiled form is evaluated using rhino functions.
2.5.1

Architecture
The four basic blocks in the Rhino JavaScript engine are - the parser, the

byte-code generator, the interpreter and the JIT [4]. Figure 20 depicts the block
diagram of the Rhino Engine [29].
Parser: The input for this module is JavaScript code and the output
generated is the Abstract Syntax Tree (AST). The AST is a tree representation of
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function gcd(a, b)
{
while (b != 0)
{
if a > b
a -= b
else
b -= a
}
return a
}

Figure 21: Euclid’s GCD algorithm.
the abstract syntactic structure of a program. For instance, Figure 21 represents the
AST for the GCD code in Figure 22 [30].
The non-leaf nodes in the AST specify the operations to be performed, for
instance, equal, comparison, arithmetic operation and so on. The leaf nodes in AST
specify operands in the source code, for instance, a and b variables [4].
Byte-Code Generator: The AST output generated from the parser acts as
input to the Byte-Code Generator which then converts the tree into byte code.
During the conversion process, the Byte-Code generator picks each code block in the
tree and translates it into bytecode. For instance, the byte code for the instruction
𝑐 = 𝑎 − 𝑏 is shown in Figure 23 [4].
The bytecode in Figure can be interpreted as 1. Load the values that are stored at offset 1 and offset 2 into registers
2. Subtract these loaded values
3. Store the result at offset 3.
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Figure 22: Abstract Syntax Tree for the GCD code in Figure 21 [30].
1
2
3
4

iload_1
iload_2
isub 3
istore_3

Figure 23: Sample byte code for the instruction 𝑐 = 𝑎 − 𝑏 [4].
Interpreter: The input for the interpreter is the byte code output of the
Byte-Code Generator. The byte code is then converted into machine level code
using the Just-in-time (JIT) compiler. During runtime, this generated machine code
gets executed. When the byte code in Figure 23 is given as input to the Interpreter,
it generates the machine code as shown in Figure 24.
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MOV
MOV
SUB
MOV

EAX
EBX
EAX
ECX

0xFF20
0xFF24
EBX
EAX

Figure 24: Sample Machine Code generated for the byte code in Figure 23 [4].
2.5.2

Modification
For this research, we need the opcodes of JavaScript code, so we used the

version of Rhino that was modified by the author of [4].
Below changes were made in the modified version [4]:
1. The page load time is directly proportional to compiling time of JavaScript, so
Rhino was optimized to convert only small part of JavaScript files. Because of
this optimization, the original statistics of the JavaScript code that will be
used as part of analysis will get affected. In order to solve this problem the
engine was modified to compile JavaScript of any length.
2. Different optimization techniques were used to optimize class files for speed
execution. As these optimization techniques also affect the statistics of
JavaScript code, they were disabled.
3. Generally opcodes are generated by decompiling the class files. This method
consumes a lot of time as this process require the generation of class file and
again decompilation of these class files. As the class files generated are of no
use, the opcodes are extracted from the code during compilation itself. By
following this approach, the time used for decompilation of class files is saved.
4. As the opcodes are extracted before the class file is created, this modification
also solved the problem associated with class files optimization.
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Figure 25: JavaScript compilation with Rhino.
5. The opcodes are tapped and redirected to the standard output. Thus all the
opcodes are printed on the screen. This output can also be saved in a file
using the unix redirect operator (>).
The below command is used to run the Rhino engine:
java -cp <path_to_rhino_js.jar> org.mozilla.javascript.tools.jsc.Main
<JavaScript_File_Path>

Figures 25 and 26 are the screenshots of compiling JavaScript code with the original
version and the modified version of Rhino respectively.
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Figure 26: JavaScript compilation with modified version of Rhino.
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CHAPTER 3
Firefox Add-on Development

An add-on is a piece of software that augments another application. Based on
the browser, different terms are used to refer to this software, like add-on, plug-in,
or extension. An add-on cannot be executed as stand-alone software. Add-ons are
used for different purposes like blocking advertisements and popups, downloading
videos, and also to integrate several social network sites.
Below are some of the applications of add-ons
1. An add-on can change the browser interface, which includes changing themes,
the look and feel of buttons, the menu bar, and tabs.
2. They are also capable of adding new features to the browser, like providing
easy usage of various softwares in the form of toolbars.
3. Add-ons can also modify the behavior of browsers, like customizing the search
option or page redirection.
4. Add-ons used as plug-ins let the browser support internet content. These
include Flash, Silverlight, and music players like QuickTime, real player,
online games, and many more.
5. On many browsers, online privacy is protected using add-ons. There are many
types of add-ons that help to control and secure browsing and avoid attacks
like preventing the user movements tracking on the browser.
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Browser Extensions are supported by Microsoft Internet Explorer starting
with version 5 released in 1999. From 2004, Mozilla Firefox supports add-ons. The
Opera browser supports extensions starting with the desktop version 10 which was
released in 2009. Google Chrome and Safari added support for extensions in 2010.
Each browser has different variations in the browser extension syntax and they are
compatible to their browser alone i.e., an extension built for one browser doesn‘t
work on another. For using search engine tools irrespective of browsers, a project
named ‘Mycroft’ [13] has been proposed, which is a database of over 20,000 search
engine add-ons supported by multiple browsers.
3.1

Firefox vs Chrome
In new era, out of all the browser extensions, Firefox and Chrome are most

well known because of their popularity, security, and appearance. Below are some of
the notable comparisons between them regarding extensions:
1. Firefox has an outstanding extension base, i.e.,
https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/, that offers more capable add-ons
compared to all other browsers.
2. Firefox add-ons are very powerful and can perform anything that a Firefox
process allows. Security features can be integrated into a Firefox add-on in a
much more effective manner than Chrome extensions. So, it is possible to
develop more advanced add-ons in Firefox, which would not be achievable on
different browsers. Unlike Firefox, Chrome does not trust extensions
completely and they provide very constrained APIs. For instance, without the
user‘s approval, extensions in Chrome can‘t access the resource present outside
of Chrome‘s sandbox, but a Firefox add-on can access the resource in the
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filesystem without the user‘s permission.
For example, even though there are many Chrome extensions like ScriptSafe,
NoScript Lite, which are similar to Firefox’s "NoScript", till now no chrome
extension is able to provide all the features of Firefox’s NoScript because of
the Chrome’s constrained extension APIs.
3. By providing constrained extension APIs, Chrome presents a permission
system and restricts its extensions a bit more for security. Whereas in Firefox,
as the add-ons has more privileges, there are chances of infecting a victim‘s
machine. At worst, we may have to re-install the operating system to undo
the effect created by a malicious add-on. To avoid these potential issues and
to ensure that the add-ons are safe to install, they are manually reviewed
before they publicly appear in the Mozilla add-ons gallery.
To detect JavaScript malware, we have to generate opcodes for the JavaScript
code in the webpage and to save these opcodes we may need access to the user‘s
filesystem and also we need to execute some other external scripts to validate the
JavaScript code based on the saved opcodes. These tasks are only possible with the
powerful APIs provided by Firefox, so we decided to implement a Firefox add-on to
detect metamorphic malware.
3.2

SDK vs XUL
There are two main ways to build Firefox extensions. The traditional way is

using XPCOM (Cross Platform Object Model) and XUL (XML User Interface
Language). Much of Mozilla‘s documentation is focused on XUL add-ons, because
this has been around for many years. More details about XUL add-on development
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can be found at [32]. The add-on SDK is the newer kind and was built under the
Jetpack Project. Jetpack‘s main agenda is to make it easy to build Firefox add-ons
by using HTML, CSS, and JavaScript [3].
It is advisable to use the Add-on SDK because of the advantages it provides
compared to XUL [33]:
1. Simplicity: High-level JavaScript APIs provided by the SDK like basic user
interface components and their functionality simplify all the common tasks in
add-on development.
2. Compatibility : Electrolysis [31], also called e10s, is the project under which
Firefox is being developed with a new multiple process architecture. The
API‘s provided by this SDK are designed to be forward-compatible with this
new architecture.
3. Security: It is not easy to build insecure add-ons using the SDK. Even the
insecure Add-on that was compromised can do much less damage to the
victim‘s machine.
4. No restarts required: To install extensions developed using the SDK, we do
not need to restart the browser.
5. Mobile Support: Add-ons can be developed for Firefox mobile using the
experimental support provided by SDK 1.5
However, XUL provides a huge number of options for the UI when compared
to the SDK, and that‘s the reason XUL is used for developing add-ons that require
a rich user interface.
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In this research, all the add-ons are built using the SDK as it provides simple
APIs for developing most of the common tasks.
3.3

Chrome Authority Usage
Chrome Authority has nothing to do with Google Chrome. The Mozilla

Developer Network(MDN) defines "chrome" as any visible parts of a browser other
than the web pages, For instance, tabs, menu bar, and toolbars.
From the beginning of developing the SDK, it was assumed that developers
may need to access the underlying browser (or) XPCOM services. So, the add-on
SDK was developed to provide "chrome privileges" to the most powerful low level
APIs. The "chrome privileges" grants low-level APIs to access the Components
object that gives unrestricted access to the user system.
With chrome privileges, an add-on can perform any function the browser is
capable of. These privileges can be obtained by the add-on using the "chrome"
module as shown below [1]:
var {Cc, Ci} = require("chrome");

The "chrome" module returns a Components object, which can be unpacked using
the destructuring assignment feature provided by Mozilla JavaScript to obtain the
Components.* aliases:
1. Cc, otherwise called Components.classes
2. Ci, otherwise called Components.interfaces
3. Cu, otherwise called Components.utils.
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4. Cr, otherwise called Components.results.
5. Cm, otherwise called Components.manager.
It is not advisable to use chrome authority in the add-on code unless it is required
because the add-ons that uses chrome authority require extra security review before
they are made available for distribution to the public.
3.4

Content Scripts
The add-on‘s main code, including "main.js" and other modules in "lib", can

use the SDK high-level and low-level APIs, but can‘t access web content directly.
Whereas content scripts can‘t use the SDK‘s APIs, but can access web content.
So if we have to build an Add-on that works based on the content of the web
page, then we have to make use of the content scripts to access the web page
contents. Content scripts are placed in the data subdirectory and they can be
loaded into Add-on using contentScript or contentScriptFile option.
Communicating with the add-on:
To enable add-on scripts and content scripts to communicate with each other,
each end of the conversation has access to a port object.
1. port.emit() is used to send messages from one side to the other
2. port.on() is used to receive messages sent from the other side
Messages are asynchronous i.e., after sending the message, sender continues
processing without waiting for a reply from the recipient.
The add-on code in Figure 28 adds a button to Firefox. When the user clicks
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Figure 27: Communication among add-on and content script [1].
this button, add-on attaches a content script to the active tab, sends the
addon-message to content script. When content script receives add-on message, it
will retrieve the first paragraph from the loaded web page and send it to add-on
along with script-response message. As soon as the add-on receives a response
from content script, it logs the first paragraph.
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//main.js
var tabs = require("sdk/tabs");
var buttons = require("sdk/ui/button/action");
var self = require("sdk/self");
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buttons.ActionButton({
id: "attach-script",
label: "Attach the script",
icon: "./icon-16.png",
onClick: attachScript
});
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function attachScript() {
var worker = tabs.activeTab.attach({
contentScriptFile: self.data.url("content-script.js")
});
worker.port.on("script-response", function(response) {
console.log(response);
});
worker.port.emit("addon-message", "Message from the add-on");
}
// content-script.js
self.port.on("addon-message", getFirstPara);

3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

function getFirstPara() {
var paras = document.getElementsByTagName("p");
if (paras.length > 0) {
var firstPara = paras[0].textContent;
self.port.emit("script-response", firstPara);
}
}

Figure 28: Communication among add-on and content script using code [1].
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CHAPTER 4
Implementation

This chapter focus on the implementation details of two add-ons:
1. a malicious add-on, which can infect the victim‘s filesystem.
2. a Transcriptase detection add-on, which can detect the metamorphic malware
embedded in the web page.
4.1

Malicious add-on
Generally browsers like Firefox, Chrome, and Opera do not allow access to the

client filesystem using JavaScript. Even though creating a file is possible in IE using
ActiveX objects, the client must enable ActiveX scripts on their system for the
ActiveX object related code to execute properly [17].
Firefox add-ons are very powerful because of the high-level APIs that the
SDK provides. The SDK has a file I/O module which provides access to the client‘s
filesystem.
A malicious add-on was created to demonstrate the way that a victim‘s
machine may get infected by a malicious add-on. The basic functionality of this
add-on is it provides the statistic value i.e., the total JavaScript bytes in the page
loaded by the user, as shown in Figure 29.
The user expects this functionality and installs the malicious add-on, but this
add-on also has hidden functionality. Whenever it finds that web page content has
Transcriptase in it, it finds all the JavaScript files present in the filesystem and
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Figure 29: Main Functionality of the malicious add-on

Figure 30: Size of sample JavaScript files before infection
prepends them with Transcriptase code and thus it infects the victim‘s filesystem.
Figure 30 shows the size of our sample JavaScript files before infection and
figure 31 shows the size of these files after infection. There is a huge difference in file
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Figure 31: JavaScript file sizes after infection
sizes before and after infection. This infection will remain unknown to the user until
the infected files are checked.
4.2

Transcriptase detection add-on
As discussed in Section 2.4, the Transcriptase virus uses different techniques

to change its internal structure in order to evade the signature based detection
strategy. The Transcriptase detection add-on can detect the Transcriptase malware
included in the webpage and notifies the user about the presence of malware
without loading the JavaScript malware.
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4.2.1

Malware Detection Technique
Despite the fact that metamorphic malware continuously changes its internal

structure to stay undetected, still for maintaining its functionality malware places
similar instructions (that implements the functionality) somewhere in the code.
Thus, all the morphed copies maintain the same statistical distribution of
instructions. Different malware detection strategies are designed to make use of
these statistical properties like Hidden Markov Models, Opcode Graph Similarity,
Simple Substitution Distance, and Singular Value Decomposition.
As mentioned in [4], if the files are having highly similar opcode statistics,
then Opcode Graph Similarity and Singular Value Decomposition can classify them
better than the Hidden Markov Model and Simple Substitution Distance. Opcode
Graph Similarity and Singular Value Decomposition are very sensitive to deadcode,
but from the results mentioned in [4] these strategies won‘t be able to distinguish
between benign code and virus code only after adding 5000 and 9000 deadcode
functions into the virus code respectively. And it is extremely uncommon for a web
page to have this much dead code. Adding to this, the ROC curves in [4] shows that
Opcode Graph Similarity performs better than Singular Value Decomposition with
less than 1000 dead code function insertions.
We used Opcode Graph Similarity technique in the Transcriptase detection
add-on.
4.2.2

Opcode Graph Similarity Technique
In [2], Anderson introduced a malware detection technique which is based on

analysis of graphs that are constructed using the opcodes of the malware code and
test code. In this technique, initially opcodes are extracted from the malware code
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and a weighted directed graph is built using the sequence of opcodes. Similarly, a
graph is built for the code to be tested. The Manhattan distance between these two
weighted graphs specifies the test file score [4].
4.2.3

Opcode Graph
A weighted directed graph built using the sequence of opcodes is known as the

‘Opcode Graph’. Each node of this graph specifies a distinct opcode in opcode
sequence. A directed edge exists from 𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒𝐴 to 𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒𝐵 , if 𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒𝐵 ‘s opcode follows the
𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒𝐴 ‘s opcode in the opcode sequence. The weight of the edge from 𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒𝐴 to
𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒𝐵 specifies the total number of times that 𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒𝐵 ‘s opcode follows 𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒𝐴 ‘s
opcode in the entire code.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

PUSH
MOV
SUB
AND
MOV
TEST
JZ
INT
MOVZX
AND
MOV
MOVZX
OR
MOV
MOV
CALL
LEAVE
RETN
ALIGN
PUSH

21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40

MOV
MOV
PUSH
PUSH
SUB
MOV
MOV
CALL
AND
SUB
CALL
MOV
CALL
MOV
XOR
MOV
MOV
MOV
CALL
MOV

Figure 32: Sample opcode sequence.
Figure 32 shows the sample opcode sequence. The adjacency matrix in
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CALL
INT
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0
0
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0
0
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0
0
0
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0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Figure 33: Weight counts adjacency matrix for opcodes in Figure 32.
Figure 33 specifies the weights of the edges formed between these opcodes. For
instance, we can find that intersection entry between the CALL row and MOV
column has a weight value of 3, which means there are three occurrences of a MOV
instruction immediately followed by a CALL instruction in the opcode sequence i.e.,
at line numbers 15, 27, and 32 in Figure 32.
All the weight counts in Figure 33 are converted into probability values by
dividing each row entry by the corresponding row sum. Figure 34 shows the weight
probabilities for the Figure 33. Each weight probability specifies the probability of
occurrence of a particular opcode, immediately after the selected opcode [4].
Figure 35 shows the opcode graph for the probability matrix in Figure 34
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LEAVE
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Figure 34: Probability matrix for weights adjacency matrix in Figure 33.
4.2.4

Similarity Score Calculation
After creating probability matrices for the malware file and the test file,

similarity between two files is calculated by taking the Manhattan distance between
two probability matrices. Consider 𝐴 as the probability matrix of file 1 and each
element in 𝐴 is denoted as 𝐴𝑖 ,𝑗 where 𝑖 and 𝑗 specifies 𝑖𝑡ℎ row and 𝑗 𝑡ℎ column
respectively. Similarly 𝐵 is the probability matrix of file 2 and each element in 𝐵 is
denoted as 𝐵𝑖 ,𝑗 . Similarity between matrix 𝐴 and 𝐵, is calculated as below [8],
Similarity score =

∑︀𝑁 −1

1
(
𝑁2

𝑖,𝑗=0

|𝑎𝑖 ,𝑗 −𝑏𝑖 ,𝑗 |2 )

where N is total number of distinct opcodes present in the combination of
both files.
Before using the similarity score, we have to determine the threshold score
which distinguishes between benign files and malware files. The threshold value is
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Figure 35: opcode graph for the probability matrix in Figure [8].
determined as follows [8],
1. Construct opcode graphs for all the variants of metamorphic malwares.
2. Construct opcode graphs for all the benign files.
3. Calculate the similarity scores for all pairs of malwares.
4. Calculate the similarity scores for every benign file against malware from step
1.
5. Determine a threshold value using the scores calculated in steps 3 and 4.
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4.3

Transcriptase detection add-on architecture

Figure 36: Detection add-on architecture
Figure 36 shows the detection add-on architecture. Each component in the
architecture is made up of one or more files. Figure 37 depicts the directory
structure of detection add-on.
1. "content-script.js" uses jQuery code to find the JavaScipt content in web page,
so included "jquery-1.10.0.min.js" file in the "/data" directory to enable this
functionality. content-script.js represents "Content Script" component.
2. The Java files in the add-on are used to download the files, and to calculate
the similarity score. All these files are placed in the "/data/java" directory.
"Java Downloader" is a combination of DownloadThread, DownloaderApp,
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Sravans−MacBook−Pro:TranscriptaseDetectionAddon sravan2j$ tree
.
|−− data
|
|−− content−script.js
|
|−− icon−16.png
|
|−− icon−32.png
|
|−− icon−64.png
|
|−− java
|
|
|−− CheckOpcodes.class
|
|
|−− DownloadThread.class
|
|
|−− DownloaderApp.class
|
|
|−− GetScore.class
|
|
|−− ImageDownloader.class
|
|
|−− Lock.class
|
|−− javaext.js
|
|−− jquery−1.10.0.min.js
|
|−− js.jar
|
|−− malware_opcodes.txt
|
|−− opcodes.bat
|
|−− opcodes.sh
|−− lib
|
|−− main.js
|−− package.json
|−− test
|−− test−main.js
4 directories, 17 files
Figure 37: Transcriptase detection add-on directory structure
ImageDownloader, and Lock class files. CheckOpcodes and GetScore class files
represents "opcode graph similarity detector".
3. "js.jar" helps the add-on to use the Rhino JS engine.
4. "opcode.sh" is a shell script to invoke Java files. As shell scripts won‘t work on
Windows, the "opcode.bat" file is included to invoke Java files on Windows.
5. The "malware_opcodes.txt" file specifies "Malware opcodes" component. This
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file contains the opcodes of Transcriptase family malware which is required to
validate web page JS content using the opcode graph similarity technique.
More details about these files and the architecture components are covered in
subsequent sections.
4.4

JavaScript extraction from web page
As soon as the user enters a web page link, the browser loads the JavaScript

content along with HTML and CSS on the page. Before extracting the JS from web
page, we have to disable JS load in the browser to prevent the execution of JS
malware code.
Enabling/disabling JS feature deals with browser preferences. The preferences
system of Mozilla browser can be accessed using XPCOM interfaces like
𝑛𝑠𝐼𝑃 𝑟𝑒𝑓 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒 and 𝑛𝑠𝐼𝑃 𝑟𝑒𝑓 𝐵𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐ℎ. The below code is used to disable
JavaScript code,
1
2
3
4
5

var prefSrv = this.prefService = Cc["@mozilla.org/preferences-service;1"]
.getService(Ci.nsIPrefService);
var PBI = Ci.nsIPrefBranch2;
this.mozJSPref = prefSrv.getBranch("javascript.").QueryInterface(PBI);
this.mozJSPref.setBoolPref("enabled", false);

Figure 38: Add-on code to disable JavaScript load on web page.
The code in Figure 38 is interpreted as follows: Line 1 in the above code
retrieves the preference services of Mozilla. nsIPrefBranch2 interface, in line 2,
allows the add-on to listen to the changes to preferences. Line 3 retrieves the
"javascript" preference and queues nsIPrefBranch2 interface using QueryInterface().
Later, setBoolPref() method is used to disable the JS by setting "false" to
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"enabled". Similarly the below line of code enables JS load,
1

this.mozJSPref.setBoolPref("enabled", true);

After disabling JavaScript, as explained in Section 3.4, the content script i.e.,
"content-script.js", is used to extract JS. "content-script.js" uses jQuery element
selector to find all the <script> elements and extract the JavaScript instructions
contained in <script> tags as shown below:
var code="";
$("script").each(function(){
code=code+$(this).html();
});

Sometimes, JavaScript code is also placed in an external file and the location of the
external JavaScript file is specified in the web page using a src attribute of a
<script> element as shown below:
<script src="external_javascript.js"></script>

There is a chance that this external files may contain JavaScript malware code, so
using the code in Figure 39, all the external file‘s URLs are extracted from the web
page. Following is the explanation of the code snippet in Figure 39:
1. "window.location.protocol" returns the protocol of the current web page URL
along with colon(:). For instance, "http:", "https:", "ftp:".
"window.location.host" returns the host name of the web page. For instance,
the hostname of
"http://www.somewebsite.com/tryit.jsp?filename=sample_code" is
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1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

var baseUrl = window.location.protocol + "//" + window.location.host + "/";
var Urls = "";
var regex = new RegExp("^(?:[a-z]+:)?//", "i");
$("script[src]").each(function(){
var sourceurl = $(this).attr("src");
if(!regex.test(sourceurl))
{
Urls=Urls+baseUrl;
}
Urls=Urls+(sourceurl.replace(/^\/+/, ""))+"\n";
});

Figure 39: JavaScript to extract all the external script file URLs
"www.somewebsite.com". So, line 1 creates a base URL of the web page.
2. line 4 uses a jQuery element selector to retrieve the external file locations
defined in src attribute of <script> tag.
3. line 6 uses regex to test whether the external files location is relative or
absolute path.
4. Line 8 contains the logic for prepending the base URL to an external file
location, if the external file location is relative path.
5. Finally, the "Urls" variable contains all the external local URLs, and these
URLs will be saved in a temporary file.
Later, the add-on invokes the 𝑜𝑝𝑐𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑠.𝑠ℎ file as shown in Figure 41, which
performs the following two functions:
Creates a temporary file
"TmpD" returns the temporary directory location of the OS. In line 1,
"opcodes.tmp" filename is concatenated to temporary directory path and
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getFile() method returns a nsIFile object referring to
"<TMP_DIR>/opcodes.tmp" location. Then createUnique() method creates
the requested temporary file.
Invokes opcode.sh
The nsIProcess interface is used to execute a process. nsIProcess requires
executable name to execute and if the executable file requires any parameters
then these parameters need to be passed as args[] to the nsIProcess.
1. Line 3 and 4 creates a nsIFile object referring to executable "/bin/sh".
2. Line 5 and 6 creates an instance of process and initializes it to "/bin/sh"
executable.
3. Line 7 and 8 adds both "opcode.sh" file path and temporary file path to
"args" array. Then the process is executed using run() which executes
the below command internally,
$ /bin/sh
/Users/sravan2j/Downloads/TranscriptaseDetectionAddon/data/opcode.sh
/tmp/opcodes.tmp

Figure 40: command that invokes opcode.sh internally

4.5

Purpose of the Shell script
The opcodes.sh code, shown in Figure 42, performs the following three

functions:
1. Line 1 executes following Java files - 𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑇 ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑.𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠,
𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟𝐴𝑝𝑝.𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠, 𝐼𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑒𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟.𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠, and 𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑘.𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠, to download
48

1

Cu.import("resource://gre/modules/FileUtils.jsm");

2
3
4
5

// create a temporary file
var file = FileUtils.getFile("TmpD", ["opcodes.tmp"]);
file.createUnique(Ci.nsIFile.NORMAL_FILE_TYPE, 0600);

6
7
8
9

var file = Cc["@mozilla.org/file/local;1"].
createInstance(Ci.nsILocalFile);
file.initWithPath("/bin/sh");

10
11
12
13

var process = Cc["@mozilla.org/process/util;1"]
.createInstance(Ci.nsIProcess);
process.init(file);

14
15

16
17
18

var args =
["/Users/sravan2j/Downloads/TranscriptaseDetectionAddon/data/opcode.sh"];
// append temporary file path to parameters
args.push(tmpFile.path);
process.run(true, args, args.length);

Figure 41: add-on code that creates temporary file and invokes opcode.sh with temporary file
all the external scripts. This java files uses multi threading approach to
download all the external scripts in parallel which reduces the total download
time.
2. After the above step, the entire JavaScript content will be saved in the
/tmp/JSStatements.js file. Line 2 takes the JSStatements.js file as input and
generates opcodes for the JavaScript code in JSStatements.js using the Rhino
JS engine. The output of this step is the "/tmp/opcodes.txt" file.
3. Line 3 executes CheckOpcodes java code which calculates the similarity score
using the opcode similarity technique, between malware_opcodes.txt and the
opcodes.txt file. The output of this step is redirected to "$1", which refers to
the arguments passed to opcodes.sh. The bash command in Figure 40 shows
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that the /tmp/opcodes.tmp file is passed as an argument while calling
opcode.sh.

1
2

3

java -Xmx500m -cp "." data/DownloaderApp data/externalUrls.txt
java -cp "./data/js.jar" org.mozilla.javascript.tools.jsc.Main
/tmp/JSStatements.js > /tmp/opcodes.txt
java -cp "./data" CheckOpcodes data/malware_opcodes.txt /tmp/opcodes.txt >
$1

Figure 42: opcode.sh shell script code

4.6

Page validation and clean-up step
The add-on gets the similarity score from the opcodes.tmp file. If the score is

less than the threshold value i.e., 0.01, then the web page is considered as a
malicious page or else it is a benign page.
1. If the page is benign, then it enables JavaScript and reloads the web page.
2. If the page is malicious, then the web page won’t be loaded; instead a prompt
is displayed to the user regarding the malware.
At the end, all the temporary files created will be removed as part of the clean-up
step.
4.7

Performance improvements
As the add-on performs lot of steps to validate the web page, the execution

time will be more. So, instead of validating every web page every time, we can skip
the validation during the following scenarios:
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4.7.1

Fingerprinting web pages
The hashcode of the benign web page should be saved in the user directory. In

the future, when user visits the same web page and if the internal content of the
page is not changed from the last visit, then the hash code of the page remains the
same as the one that was saved on user‘s machine. In this case, we can safely skip
the validation of the web page.
The disadvantage with this approach is that it consumes the user‘s system
memory as it saves the hashcode for every web page the user visits.
We can also improve this approach by saving the hash codes in the cloud
repository. Whenever any user visits the web page, the add-on connects with the
cloud repository and checks if this web page was already validated by any user
earlier or not. If it was validated, is the web page hash code the same? And what is
the validation result? If the hash code is not in the cloud, then it will be validated
by the current user‘s plugin and the result will be stored in the cloud, so that this
data will be useful for other users. Because of this approach, the user‘s system
memory will be saved and also at any point of time, the web page is validated only
once by any user. Necessary security measures should be taken inorder to prevent
the attacks like man-in-the-middle attack, cloud data tampering.
4.7.2

Whitelisting websites
Some popular websites are highly secured and regularly monitored, like

Google, Facebook, Amazon etc. These websites can be added to benign page list by
the user, so that they won‘t be validated by the add-on.
The disadvantage of this approach is that it involves a risk of infection if the
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whitelisted web pages are infected by malware.
4.8

Using other detection techniques
Currently this add-on uses only opcode graph similarity detection. Other

detection techniques can be used in the add-on by simply changing line 3 of
opcode.sh, shown in 42, to execute a program that implements another detection
technique instead of executing the CheckOpcodes program. The new program
should accept "malware_opcodes.txt" and "/tmp/opcodes.txt" as input files and
the similarity score should be saved in the "/tmp/opcodes.tmp" file. No other
changes are required.
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CHAPTER 5
Testing

To check the accuracy and performance of the add-on, we used malware web
pages and benign web pages. To create malware samples, we generated different
variants of Transcriptase malware. For benign web pages, we retrieved the
JavaScript dead code from http://tools.w3clubs.com/jojo/.
Entire testing is performed on a system with the configuration specified in
Table 1:
Table 1: System Specifications
System Model

MacBook Pro (Retina, 13-inch, Mid 2014)

Processor

2.8 GHz Intel Core i5

RAM

16 GB 1600 MHz DDR3

Storage

120 GB

Firefox version

36.0.4

SDK version

Add-on SDK 1.17

Rhino version

Rhino 1.7R4, modified to output opcodes during JS compilation

Java version

1.7.0_71

5.1

Generating Transcriptase variants
Transcriptase was written in JScript, so in a windows system it can be

executed by simply double clicking it. From my observation, the generation of each
version takes around 15 minutes.
As explained in Section 2.4, Transcriptase carries its source code as meta
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instructions and on each execution it creates different variant of its JS source, then
prepends that JS code to all the JavaScript files in its directory. So, I followed the
below steps to create 100 versions:
1. Created an empty JavaScript file in the Transcriptase directory.
2. Executed Transcriptase, which infects the new empty JavaScript file and
converts it to another variant of Transcriptase.
3. Move the older version Transcriptase (or creator Transcriptase) to different
folder.
4. Then created an empty JavaScript file in the current folder where the new
Transcriptase variant exists.
5. Executed the new variant to infect the empty JavaScript file. Go to Step 3 if
the required number of variants aren‘t generated.
The code in Figure 43 automates the above mentioned steps.
1

2
3
4
5
6
7
8

FOR %%A IN (1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48
49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72
73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96
97 98 99 100) DO (
transcriptase.js
REN transcriptase.js "var%%~nA.*"
MOVE "var%%~nA.*" "C:\Users\Sravan\Downloads\Transcriptase\versions"
REN empty.js transcriptase.js
COPY "C:\Users\Sravan\Downloads\Transcriptase\template\empty.js" .
)
PAUSE

Figure 43: Batch script that automates the Transcriptase variants generations
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Figure 44: Transcriptase‘s 100 versions.
5.2

Similarity scores and add-on performance
Included console.log() functions in the add-on to log the following details -

opcode similarity score and the add-on execution time taken to validate the web
page. The below sub section deals with comparison of these details for benign and
malware web pages. For testing the add-on, we used 100 samples of benign web
page and morphed malware web pages. Malware web pages are morphed by adding
randomly generated junk code to it.
5.2.1

Addition of 550 lines of dead code
For this experiment, we used benign web page samples with 550 lines of junk

code and also added the same amount of randomly generated junk code to malware
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web pages. Tables 2 and 3 contain the details of scores and execution time for the
benign and malware samples, respectively. From the table values, we can see that
the scores for benign web pages are in the order of 10−3 whereas the scores for
malware web pages are in the order of 10−4 . The graph in Figure 45 clearly shows
that the add-on is able to distinguish malware web pages and benign web pages
correctly. Only 3 out of 100 malware samples have score similar to benign web
pages.

Figure 45: Benign samples scores vs malware samples scores with the addition of 550
lines of dead code

5.2.2

Addition of 5500 lines of dead code
This experiment is same as the above experiment except that here 5500 lines

of dead code was included in malware and benign web pages instead of 500 lines.
Tables 4 and 5 contains the details of scores and execution time for this experiment.
From the table values, we can see that the scores for benign web pages and malware
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web pages are still in the order of 10−3 and 10−4 , respectively. The graph in
Figure 46 clearly shows that even after adding 5500 lines of code, the add-on is able
to distinguish malware web pages and benign web pages correctly. Only 3 out of 100
malware samples have scores similar to benign web pages.

Figure 46: Benign samples scores vs malware samples scores with the addition of 5500
lines of dead code

5.2.3

Addition of 15000 lines of dead code
Here, 15000 lines of dead code were included in malware and benign samples.

From the tables 6 and 7, it is clear that scores of malware web pages are varied by a
very negligible value when compared to previous experiments. So as shown in
Figure 47, the add-on is still able to distinguish malware web pages and benign web
pages correctly.
As mentioned in Section 4.2.4, the scores of malware files and benign files can
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Figure 47: Benign samples scores vs malware samples scores with the addition of
15000 lines of dead code
be compared to calculate the threshold score value of the opcode similarity
technique. From the tables 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7, except 9 malwares all other malware
scores are in between 0.000369822260 and 0.000369822750. The 9 exception
malware scores are between 0.001423994000 and 0.001423994700. And the benign
web page scores are between 0.001479288900 and 0.001479291400. The same
information is represented with table 8
The threshold value can be any value between 0.00142 and 0.00147. If the
lower percentage of false negative rate is acceptable, then the threshold score can be
chosen between 0.00036 and 0.00147. In case of malware detection, it is always
better to have fewer false negatives, so I use 0.00145 as the threshold score value
for the add-on.
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5.3

Test for False Positive rate of the add-on
I tested the add-on on popular web sites to detect the "false positive" rate of

the add-on. The popular web site links are retrieved from [34].
The table 9 contains the scores and execution time details. All the scores in
the table are more than the chosen threshold value (i.e., 0.00145), which means that
the add-on validated all the web pages as benign web pages i.e., add-on has zero
false positive rate.
5.4

Splitting Transcriptase code
Transcriptase can be split into several external JS files and then the external

files can be included in a web page. So, the following experiment was performed to
calculate the scores of split files by dividing Transcriptase into a various number of
files.
The code was split based on functions count. The experiment was started by
dividing the Transcriptase code into two files with almost equal number of functions
and then continued till the split files count reaches 76. A parser was developed in
Python to detect the valid start and end point of the JavaScript functions and to
properly split the Transcriptase code. Thus the resultant split files are syntactically
correct. Corresponding parser code is shown in Appendix A, Section A.1.
Table 10 shows the results for various splits. The "Max" and "Min" column
specify the maximum and minimum similarity score among the split files,
respectively. The "count" column specifies the number of files the Transcriptase
code was split into.
Figure 48 is a graphical representation of the Table 10 values. The graph
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clearly shows that even when the code was split, the minimum score among the
split files is always less than threshold which means that there always
exists at least one split file with score a less than threshold score. Thus, it
is possible to detect the malware even by testing all the external files separately. So,
we can validate all the external scripts parallely to increase the performance of the
add-on.

Figure 48: Graph showing min and max scores of Transcriptase split files.
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Score

Time
(milliseconds)

Score

Time
(milliseconds)

Score

Time
(milliseconds)

Score

Time
(milliseconds)

0.00147929

1136

0.00147929

1135

0.00147929

1482

0.0014792903

1232

0.00147929

1172

0.0014792896

1124

0.0014792896

1304

0.0014792907

1115

0.00147929

1150

0.0014792907

1113

0.00147929

1245

0.00147929

1308

0.00147929

1125

0.0014792903

1178

0.0014792907

1274

0.0014792896

1159

0.0014792893

1080

0.0014792896

1133

0.0014792896

1235

0.00147929

1125

0.00147929

1223

0.0014792903

1133

0.0014792903

1242

0.0014792903

1228

0.0014792896

1125

0.00147929

1134

0.0014792903

1246

0.0014792896

1180

0.0014792903

1132

0.0014792893

1106

0.0014792903

1250

0.0014792893

1131

0.001479291

1120

0.00147929

1142

0.0014792903

1257

0.00147929

1136

0.0014792903

1198

0.0014792896

1159

0.0014792903

1255

0.0014792907

1132

0.0014792903

1134

0.0014792896

1125

0.0014792903

1214

0.0014792896

1141

0.0014792907

1131

0.0014792907

1122

0.0014792903

1152

0.00147929

1134

0.0014792903

1108

0.00147929

1176

0.0014792896

1116

0.0014792896

1124

0.00147929

1110

0.0014792903

1134

0.0014792907

1138

0.0014792903

1410

0.00147929

1124

0.0014792893

1113

0.00147929

1105

0.0014792907

1123

0.0014792893

1122

0.00147929

1168

0.0014792907

1093

0.00147929

1150

0.0014792907

1116

0.00147929

1135

0.0014792903

1175

0.0014792903

1175

0.0014792896

1117

0.0014792907

1118

0.0014792907

1121

0.0014792903

1116

0.0014792903

1198

0.0014792903

1148

0.0014792903

1127

0.0014792893

1125

0.00147929

1122

0.0014792907

1102

0.0014792903

1167

0.0014792896

1143

0.00147929

1137

0.0014792893

1144

0.0014792903

1105

0.0014792903

1223

0.00147929

1204

0.0014792896

1098

0.0014792907

1113

0.0014792903

1120

0.0014792907

1130

0.00147929

1152

0.0014792896

1111

0.0014792907

1140

0.00147929

1104

0.0014792903

1129

0.00147929

1140

0.00147929

1213

0.0014792903

1119

0.00147929

1215

0.00147929

1149

0.00147929

1119

Table 2: Table illustrating the scores and add-on execution time for 100 benign web
pages, in four columns (i.e., 25 samples per column). Benign webpages are generated
with 550 lines of dead code.
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Score

Time
(milliseconds)

Score

Time
(milliseconds)

Score

Time
(milliseconds)

Score

Time
(milliseconds)

0.00036982258

7897

0.00036982243

6707

0.00036982258

7888

0.0003698225

6642

0.00036982258

6875

0.001423994

7493

0.00036982243

8133

0.00036982234

7355

0.00036982258

6284

0.0003698224

6041

0.0003698224

8576

0.00036982235

7489

0.0014239943

6430

0.00036982266

7119

0.00036982258

7785

0.00036982266

7072

0.00036982234

7629

0.0003698225

7223

0.00036982243

8536

0.00036982258

6941

0.00036982238

7682

0.00036982258

7159

0.00036982234

7118

0.0003698225

7372

0.00036982266

7774

0.0003698225

8297

0.0003698225

7138

0.00036982243

7832

0.00036982266

8075

0.00036982243

6949

0.00036982243

6917

0.00036982258

7158

0.0003698225

6127

0.00036982243

8550

0.00036982243

6475

0.00036982258

6603

0.00036982258

7312

0.0003698225

7157

0.00036982243

8109

0.0003698224

8482

0.00036982258

8038

0.0003698225

7532

0.00036982258

7013

0.00036982243

7718

0.00036982258 10123

0.0003698224

6904

0.00036982258

6740

0.00036982258

6723

0.00036982236

8091

0.0003698225

6679

0.0003698225

7239

0.00036982258

8046

0.00036982245

6392

0.00036982258

7031

0.0003698225

7138

0.0003698225

7845

0.00036982238

6518

0.00036982258

6438

0.00036982258

6088

0.00036982258

7862

0.00036982251

7121

0.00036982266

8230

0.00036982243

7529

0.00036982258

9817

0.00036982243

6309

0.0003698225

9986

0.0003698224

8031

0.0003698224

7804

0.00036982258

8646

0.0003698225

6958

0.0003698224

7753

0.0003698225

9849

0.00036982243

6706

0.00036982243 10166

0.0014239943

6494

0.0003698225

9302

0.00036982258

6617

0.0003698225

8358

0.00036982258

6815

0.00036982256

7239

0.00036982241

6502

0.00036982251

6129

0.00036982266

8174

0.00036982263

7652

0.00036982232

7289

0.00036982249

6732

0.00036982275

8314

0.0003698225

7261

0.0003698224

7236

0.00036982258

7730

0.00036982266

7465

0.00036982258

6398

0.00036982258

7746

0.00036982258

7719

0.00036982266

7113

0.0003698225

8812

0.00036982243

7267

0.00036982258

7992

0.00036982258

6757

0.00036982243

8357

Table 3: Table illustrating the scores and add-on execution time for 100 malware web
pages, in four columns (i.e., 25 samples per column). Malware webpages are morphed
with 550 lines of dead code.
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Score

Time
(milliseconds)

Score

Time
(milliseconds)

Score

Time
(milliseconds)

Score

Time
(milliseconds)

0.0014792907

2287

0.0014792903

1937

0.00147929

2379

0.0014792903

3148

0.00147929

2447

0.0014792893

2813

0.0014792896

1966

0.0014792907

2210

0.00147929

2215

0.0014792903

2153

0.0014792903

2728

0.0014792903

2094

0.0014792907

2376

0.0014792903

2604

0.00147929

2167

0.0014792903

2068

0.00147929

2188

0.0014792914

2221

0.0014792903

2022

0.0014792907

2462

0.0014792903

2661

0.00147929

2152

0.0014792907

2383

0.0014792893

2060

0.0014792907

1989

0.0014792903

2404

0.0014792903

2033

0.00147929

2074

0.00147929

2137

0.00147929

2260

0.00147929

2463

0.0014792903

2254

0.0014792903

2001

0.0014792907

2110

0.0014792903

2535

0.0014792893

2564

0.0014792907

2003

0.0014792893

2226

0.0014792903

2026

0.0014792903

2084

0.00147929

2646

0.0014792903

2134

0.0014792907

2030

0.0014792903

2406

0.0014792903

1969

0.0014792903

2115

0.0014792907

1944

0.0014792903

2437

0.0014792903

1972

0.0014792903

2003

0.0014792893

2239

0.0014792889

2317

0.0014792903

1937

0.0014792893

1989

0.0014792893

2270

0.0014792903

2001

0.0014792903

1992

0.00147929

2599

0.00147929

1954

0.0014792903

1933

0.0014792896

2612

0.0014792893

2277

0.0014792907

1961

0.00147929

1994

0.0014792903

2092

0.0014792896

1971

0.0014792893

2240

0.0014792903

1967

0.0014792907

2453

0.0014792903

2388

0.0014792907

2280

0.00147929

2279

0.0014792903

2028

0.00147929

1983

0.00147929

1966

0.0014792903

1968

0.00147929

2018

0.0014792903

1996

0.0014792903

1985

0.001479291

1978

0.0014792903

2010

0.0014792903

1990

0.00147929

1978

0.0014792907

1946

0.0014792896

1981

0.0014792903

2034

0.00147929

1995

0.0014792903

1980

0.0014792893

1967

0.00147929

1980

0.0014792907

1987

0.00147929

1942

0.0014792903

1938

0.0014792903

2005

0.00147929

1962

0.00147929

1989

0.0014792896

2324

0.0014792903

2103

0.0014792907

2497

0.0014792903

1985

Table 4: Table illustrating the scores and add-on execution time for 100 benign web
pages, in four columns (i.e., 25 samples per column). Benign webpages are generated
with 5500 lines of dead code.
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Score

Time
(milliseconds)

Score

Time
(milliseconds)

Score

Time
(milliseconds)

Score

Time
(milliseconds)

0.00036982243

8233

0.00036982243

8232

0.0003698225

8499

0.00036982258

7472

0.0003698225

7442

0.0014239947

8681

0.0003698225

7973

0.00036982226

8276

0.0003698225

7297

0.0003698225

6720

0.0003698224

8310

0.00036982235

8916

0.0014239941

7827

0.0003698225

7818

0.00036982258

7843

0.00036982243

7925

0.00036982258

7850

0.00036982258

8466

0.00036982258

7476

0.00036982258

7405

0.00036982247

8132

0.00036982243

7717

0.00036982234

7933

0.0003698224

8014

0.00036982258

8478

0.0003698225

9749

0.00036982258

7844

0.0003698225

8181

0.0003698225

8910

0.00036982243

7992

0.00036982234

9089

0.0003698225

7358

0.0003698224

7029

0.0003698225

7495

0.00036982243

7412

0.00036982266

7505

0.00036982234

8039

0.00036982258

7474

0.0003698225

9174

0.00036982275

8958

0.00036982234

7937

0.00036982243

7743

0.0003698225

7246

0.00036982258

8510

0.00036982258

8008

0.00036982266

7970

0.0003698225

7440

0.0003698225

7740

0.00036982243

8012

0.00036982266

8106

0.00036982258

8472

0.00036982258

8390

0.00036982257

7884

0.00036982258

7892

0.0003698224

7832

0.00036982258

8352

0.00036982241

8593

0.0003698225

7070

0.0003698225

6720

0.00036982243

8671

0.00036982249

8147

0.0003698225

7188

0.00036982243

8236

0.0003698224

8519

0.0003698225

7143

0.00036982232

8449

0.00036982258

8064

0.0003698225

6830

0.0003698225

8747

0.00036982266

7731

0.00036982243

8323

0.0003698224

8421

0.00036982258

7226

0.00036982258

8379

0.0014239943

7039

0.00036982243

8282

0.00036982258

7001

0.00036982243

9518

0.00036982251

7213

0.00036982249

7813

0.00036982249

6871

0.00036982249

9287

0.00036982243

9476

0.00036982252

8132

0.00036982243

7892

0.00036982252

8936

0.00036982266

8468

0.0003698224

7930

0.0003698225

7989

0.0003698224

8250

0.00036982243

8304

0.0003698225

7418

0.00036982234

7814

0.0003698224

8658

0.00036982258

7766

0.0003698225

9372

0.0003698225

8370

0.00036982258

8248

0.00036982258

7644

0.00036982266

8933

Table 5: Table illustrating the scores and add-on execution time for 100 malware web
pages, in four columns (i.e., 25 samples per column). Malware webpages are morphed
with 5500 lines of dead code.
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Score

Time
(milliseconds)

Score

Time
(milliseconds)

Score

Time
(milliseconds)

Score

Time
(milliseconds)

0.0014792903

3241

0.001479291

3301

0.0014792903

3274

0.0014792903

3484

0.0014792903

3180

0.00147929

3162

0.00147929

3355

0.0014792896

3342

0.00147929

3172

0.0014792896

3134

0.00147929

3345

0.0014792903

3415

0.0014792893

3291

0.0014792903

3150

0.00147929

3185

0.0014792896

3409

0.001479291

3161

0.0014792896

3545

0.0014792907

3184

0.0014792896

3536

0.0014792903

3178

0.00147929

3104

0.00147929

3445

0.00147929

3540

0.0014792907

3182

0.00147929

3167

0.0014792896

4519

0.0014792903

3794

0.00147929

3378

0.0014792896

3307

0.00147929

3448

0.0014792896

3786

0.00147929

3575

0.0014792907

3192

0.0014792907

3361

0.0014792896

3696

0.00147929

3563

0.0014792896

3131

0.00147929

3181

0.0014792896

3513

0.0014792903

3271

0.0014792903

3216

0.0014792903

3383

0.0014792903

3405

0.0014792907

3188

0.0014792889

3320

0.0014792903

4725

0.0014792907

3608

0.0014792903

3122

0.0014792896

3137

0.0014792903

3602

0.00147929

3275

0.00147929

3467

0.0014792903

3225

0.0014792907

3217

0.0014792893

3439

0.0014792903

3197

0.0014792903

3328

0.00147929

3464

0.00147929

3700

0.0014792907

3149

0.0014792903

3329

0.00147929

3159

0.0014792907

3230

0.0014792893

3139

0.00147929

3201

0.0014792903

4870

0.00147929

3221

0.0014792893

3100

0.0014792896

3171

0.0014792896

3244

0.0014792907

3199

0.00147929

3206

0.0014792903

4664

0.00147929

3292

0.0014792896

3239

0.0014792903

3139

0.00147929

3105

0.00147929

3417

0.00147929

3133

0.0014792896

3159

0.0014792893

3177

0.0014792903

3341

0.0014792903

3300

0.001479291

3102

0.00147929

3467

0.00147929

4321

0.0014792903

3420

0.0014792903

3267

0.0014792903

3426

0.00147929

3587

0.0014792896

5329

0.00147929

3359

0.00147929

3421

0.0014792893

3333

0.0014792907

3614

0.0014792903

3412

0.00147929

3400

0.001479291

3289

0.0014792903

3450

Table 6: Table illustrating the scores and add-on execution time for 100 benign web
pages, in four columns (i.e., 25 samples per column). Benign webpages are generated
with 15000 lines of dead code.
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Score

Time
(milliseconds)

Score

Time
(milliseconds)

Score

Time
(milliseconds)

Score

Time
(milliseconds)

0.00036982258

9192

0.0003698224

9179

0.0003698225

9225

0.00036982266

8274

0.00036982258

9105

0.0003698225

7719

0.0003698225

9240

0.00036982258

8962

0.0003698225

9104

0.00036982258

8207

0.0003698225

9458

0.00036982263

9132

0.0003698225

9303

0.00036982243

9510

0.00036982266

8810

0.0003698225

8588

0.00036982258

8568

0.00036982258

9779

0.00036982243

8545

0.0003698224

8185

0.00036982241

9942

0.0003698225

9537

0.0014239943

8158

0.0003698224

8915

0.00036982266

9502

0.00036982266

9766

0.00036982258

8540

0.00036982266

9395

0.0003698224

9791

0.0003698225

8802

0.0003698225

9080

0.00036982258

8165

0.0003698225

7951

0.00036982243 10122 0.00036982258

9233

0.00036982234

8113

0.0003698225

8565

0.0003698225

9180

0.0003698224

8556

0.0003698225

9760

0.0003698225

8059

0.00036982234

8254

0.0003698224

9702

0.0003698224

9330

0.0003698225

8889

0.00036982258

8146

0.00036982258

9082

0.00036982258

8756

0.0003698225

8884

0.00036982258

7851

0.0003698225

9281

0.0003698225

9336

0.00036982235

9126

0.00036982258

8672

0.00036982258

8465

0.0003698225

8828

0.00036982251

9631

0.00036982258

7948

0.00036982258

9770

0.00036982258

9277

0.0003698226

8128

0.00036982266

8689

0.00036982258

9211

0.0003698225

9478

0.00036982243

7919

0.0003698225

8264

0.00036982243

9809

0.00036982258

7847

0.0003698225

9433

0.0003698225

8562

0.0003698224

9109

0.00036982266

9312

0.0003698225

8202

0.00036982258

8119

0.001423994

9592

0.00036982266

8933

0.00036982243

8400

0.00036982266

8845

0.0014239942

1070

0.00036982249

9612

0.00036982252

9783

0.00036982266

8845

0.00036982266

9750

0.00036982258

8495

0.00036982258

8811

0.00036982266

8845

0.00036982243

9469

0.0003698224

8855

0.00036982275 10339

0.0003698225

9078

0.0003698224

8303

0.00036982258

7895

0.0003698225

8925

0.00036982258

9246

0.00036982258

8821

0.0003698224

10477

0.00036982243

9367

0.0003698224

8687

0.00036982258

8830

0.00036982243

8510

Table 7: Table illustrating the scores and add-on execution time for 100 malware
web pages, in four columns (i.e., 25 samples per column). Malware web pages are
morphed with 15000 lines of dead code.
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Table 8: Table illustrating the max and min scores for all the sample files, after
comparing the scores from the tables 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7.
Min Score
291 malware samples

Max Score

0.000369822260 0.000369822750

9 exceptional malware samples 0.001423994000 0.001423994700
300 benign samples

0.001479288900 0.001479291400
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Table 9: Table contains scores and add-on execution time details for popular web
pages.
Web page

Score

Time (Milli seconds)

Result

https://www.google.com/

0.025195263

2189

Benign page

https://www.facebook.com/

0.08652405

3190

Benign page

http://www.baidu.com/

0.051652893

4442

Benign page

http://www.twitter.com/

0.8132002

4076

Benign page

http://www.taobao.com

0.29001402

3401

Benign page

http://www.qq.com/

0.014076417

3177

Benign page

https://www.linkedin.com

0.0916255

4309

Benign page

https://live.com

0.30142236

1379

Benign page

http://www.sina.com.cn/

0.04421566

2513

Benign page

http://us.weibo.com/gb

0.210642001

2921

Benign page

http://www.hao123.com/

0.046390533

5314

Benign page

http://www.bing.com/

0.30142236

1323

Benign page

http://www.apple.com/

0.0625

5505

Benign page

http://www.aliexpress.com/

0.06497499

1794

Benign page

http://www.imdb.com/

0.041259766

8022

Benign page

http://www.alibaba.com/

0.0047562416

3206

Benign page

http://www.ask.com/

0.051652893

4611

Benign page

https://www.netflix.com

0.0625

10046

Benign page

http://www.naver.com/

0.30142236

2504

Benign page

http://diply.com/

0.05702829

8612

Benign page

https://mail.google.com

0.30142236

1713

Benign page

http://www.youku.com/

0.051652893

4044

Benign page

http://www.flipkart.com/

0.018838914

1604

Benign page

https://www.amazon.com/

0.100754

2839

Benign page

http://www.wikipedia.org/

0.094681033

1914

Benign page
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Table 10: Splitting Transcriptase into several files
Count

Min

Max

Count

1

3.70E-04

3.70E-04

20

1.68E-18 0.018838914

2

1.28E-18

1.16E-17

21

1.81E-17 0.018838914

3

1.77E-19

1.39E-17

22

1.69E-19 0.018838914

4

6.17E-19

1.75E-17

23

9.64E-20 0.018838914

5

4.41E-20

3.84E-04

24

7.37E-19 0.018838914

6

5.36E-18

0.00153787

26

1.61E-19

7

4.57E-19

3.84E-04

27

2.27E-17 0.018838914

8

2.19E-18

0.00153787

29

9.72E-19 0.018838914

9

1.86E-17

0.00153787

31

3.85E-18 0.018838914

10

1.69E-19 0.003460208

33

6.35E-18 0.018838914

11

1.73E-18

0.00615148

35

4.33E-18 0.018838914

12

3.91E-18 0.003460208

38

4.37E-18 0.018838914

13

5.64E-20

0.00615148

42

8.12E-18 0.018838914

14

5.47E-19 0.003460208

46

4.41E-20 0.018838914

15

1.88E-18

0.00615148

51

5.21E-18 0.018838914

16

8.01E-20 0.009611688

57

1.96E-17 0.018838914

17

1.26E-18 0.013840835

65

3.84E-04 0.024605926

18

5.07E-19 0.009611691

76

3.84E-04 0.024605926

19

8.01E-19 0.018838914
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Min

Max

0.01883891

CHAPTER 6
Conclusion and Future Enhancements

The aim of this research was to build a Mozilla add-on to detect metamorphic
JavaScript malware embedded in a web page. For this purpose, I implemented an
add-on using the Mozilla add-on SDK. Internally, the add-on uses the Rhino
JavaScript engine to generate opcodes for the JavaScript content of a web page. As
the opcode graph similarity technique performs better while classifying the files with
similar opcode statistics, this technique was used in the add-on as a malware
detection technique. Test results from chapter 5 show that a threshold score value
0.00145 is able to classify the Transcriptase malware family viruses and benign web
pages properly even after adding significant amount of junk code. A similar
approach can be used for all the different types of metamorphic malware.
Test results also show that execution time for the add-on is around 1 to 4
seconds for benign web pages and 6 to 11 seconds for malware web pages. Even
though the execution overhead seems significant, the user is able to view the HTML
and CSS content of the page properly during the add-on execution period. As
discussed in Section 4.7.1, future enhancements for this thesis can include extending
the add-on to use the cloud to increase the add-on performance. This enhancement
requires efficient security measures, so that an intruder can’t eavesdrop/tamper with
the information passed to and from cloud.
Future enhancements also include eliminating the burden of validating some
external JavaScript files by storing their links as white lists. For instance, several
web pages may have JavaScript code to display Google Ads, as Google is secured
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and regularly monitored, we can safely consider all the external Google Ads related
JavaScript files as benign files. This approach may also involve some risk if any of
the web page in the white list is attacked.
Different malware detection techniques can be added to the add-on to increase
the detection rate. As discussed in Section 4.8, the add-on provides simple way to
include other detection techniques.
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APPENDIX
Code snippets
A.1

Python parser

Listing A.1: The parser code detects the valid start and end point of the JavaScript
functions and properly splits the Transcriptase code.
1

with open("transcriptase.js", "r") as ins:

2

total_functions = 1000

3

line = ins.read()

4

k = sys.argv[1]

5

required = (int)(total_functions/k)

6

cnt,braces,rbraces,sbraces,brackets_match,func_ind = 0,0,0,0,0,0

7

skip, eachfun_done = False, False

8

data, skip_char = ’’, ’’

9

function_start = True

10

func = [’f’,’u’,’n’,’c’,’t’,’i’,’o’,’n’]

11

for c in line:

12

if cnt == required and eachfun_done == True:

13

cnt = 0

14

eachfun_done = False

15

#write data into a file

16

data=’’

17

if (c==’\textquotedblleft’ or c=="\textquoteleft") and skip==False:

18

skip = True

19

data = data+c

20

skip_char = c
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21

22

continue
if skip == True:

23

data = data+c

24

if skip_char == c:

25

skip = False

26

skip_char = ’’

27

28

29

30

31

32

33

34

35

36

37

continue
if c == ’(’:
rbraces+=1
elif c == ’)’:
rbraces-=1
if c == ’[’:
sbraces+=1
elif c == ’]’:
sbraces-=1
if c == ’{’:
if function_start==True:
function_start=False

38

39

40

41

42

43

braces+=1
elif c == ’}’:
braces-=1
if braces == 0 and sbraces ==0 and rbraces == 0:
if function_start==False:
eachfun_done = True

44

45

else:

46

data = data +c

47

continue
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48

49

50

if func[func_ind] == c:
func_ind+=1
else:

51

func_ind=0

52

if func_ind == 8:

53

total_functions+=1

54

cnt+=1

55

function_start=True

56

eachfun_done = False

57

func_ind=0

58

data+=c

59

if data != "":

60

cnt = 0

61

eachfun_done = False

62

#write data into a file

63

data=’’
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